The reason it is so important to consider Augustus’s stance on a frontier policy is because as first Princeps he may be argued to have set any kind of ‘grand strategy’ that emerged and dominated military expansion (or lack of it) within the next two centuries as a result. Indeed Luttwak argues that there was an understanding in the early Empire that military force was a costly and limited ‘instrument of power’ and that it was better to rule through psychological power than physical. This meant less of a public Roman presence in conquered provinces to avoid riling crowds of the vanquished but rather to control the local heads of state and allow the nations to function in their normal fashion to whatever extent suited Rome. This indirect rule was not a new strategy but became favoured increasingly over and above more conventional military means post Augustus and Luttwak argues that it was a foundation of the ‘grand strategy’ towards Roman frontiers in the early Empire period. An example of this style of control can be seen through Pliny the Younger’s letters to Trajan in which we can see a detailed example of how one particular province (Bithynia and Pontus) was run though of course one must understand that Pliny is just a singular example and is not necessarily representative of other provincial governors. Nevertheless as our only preserved example Pliny seems to rely heavily on the Emperor’s authority before making decisions which, due to the length of time in which a message could have been delivered and answered across nations in the ancient world, hinders progress and wastes resources. It is interesting that Trajan was the Emperor under who Pliny was provincial governor as despite Trajan’s grand expansion and glorified notion of war upon his column in Rome, his numerous replies to Pliny and perhaps many other provincial governors also (though we can only theorise this) suggests that he still understood the limits of empire and fits the ideal of a ‘grand strategy’ following Augustus’ precedent at least in concept.
Focusing now then on the fortification of the frontiers, Luttwak explains that they were not meant for defence or to limit expansion and served actually as lookout posts for invading forces. They were therefore lightly garrisoned usually and at times of crisis entire legions were seemingly transferred over from quieter areas to deal with the threat. Of course this is an impractical system in the event that the Empire was attacked on multiple fronts simultaneously and the benefit of hindsight allows us to see how such a situation unravelled in the 3rd century crisis with the ‘collapse’ of the Western Roman Empire. Therefore we perhaps must question the grammar of the notion we are considering, for if the Roman Empire did indeed have a strategy towards its frontiers in our period it was certainly not grand and well considered. The fortifications in our period were very limited and served mainly as a marker of the extent of Roman territory for trade and civic purposes so Luttwak argues that it is not until after our period later in the Empire that the frontiers become ‘solid fortresses’ upon which time, he concludes, there is the emergence of a true ‘grand strategy’ for the frontiers. Continuing on this trail of thought, perhaps then there is no ‘grand strategy’ as such in our period at all but simply a series of similar and reasonably logical decisions made by emperors. As there is no border crisis in comparison to the 3rd century within the first two there was no need essentially for secure borders. With hindsight we can see the need for security but when one considers that Rome’s dominance was virtually unchallenged barring perhaps Parthia it is more understandable to think that the Romans did not feel the need for a ‘grand strategy’ at their frontiers and it arguably took a crisis to force their hand in improving defences. Of course there is some argument that Rome didn’t need to consider a ‘grand strategy’ on their borders or moreover worry about their fortifications if you believe the idea of defensive imperialism which is that Rome only took over most of the known world because they were forced into each and every war either in defence of themselves or an ally. The roman society is based on military glory and this concept has long been disregarded therefore but it held for a surprising amount of time and thus little scholarly opinion has been given to this topic which makes it all the more fascinating and important to consider. Whittaker questions the value of defensive interests to a Roman emperor, emphasising the military nature of the Roman state and further portraying the fortifications as simply landmarkers.
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