Furthermore, Kim Il Sung was already an important figure in North Korea, indeed the same telegram to Malenkov identifies him as an ideal candidate for governance, but Soviet backing allowed him to gain supreme power, and as so often, power corrupts. The USSR effectively created the police state we see in North Korea today by promoting Kim Il Sung and then leaving him to govern without Soviet assistance, as was their policy in Asia, ironically to avoid antagonising America. This extreme regime could never realistically become involved in negotiations with the South which, though far from democratic under Rhee, was nevertheless a stark contrast. China eventually joined the war when the US neared their border, but Stalin had asked Mao for assistance since 1949 and explained that ultimately China was needed to help with the Soviet foreign policy intentions of a united Korea under communism. Unfortunately we do not have official records of Soviet foreign policy as, unlike the White House, the Kremlin has chosen not to declassify Cold War government documents, which means there is more speculation than evidence to many arguments unfortunately. What is certain, however, is that Communism is not compatible with Capitalism, and as long as foreign powers with rival ideologies intervened in Korea, they only worsened the national split.
It would be unjust to conclude this paper without dedicating some words to the roles of North and South Korea in their divided nation. As Victor Cha explains, we cannot understand why the North Korean people, even those who have escaped, see their leader almost as a God. The living conditions are poor and the level of censorship and indoctrination is terrifying. To us it seems logical that Korea unite under the example of the South, but we do not understand the identity the North has created for itself. Neither Kim Il Sung or Singman Rhee had any intention of a divided Korea when they were relieved of Japanese rule, but it was forced upon them by the US and USSR. Once divided however, a new identity began to emerge for the North and South and resentment of the other increased through the war as brother fought brother. By time of the armistice in 1953, one might argue that the North and South were so different and so alienated from one another that they no longer wanted to be united. The worst mistake a historian can make in studying the Korean divide is to assume that it is entirely the fault of external influences. Though there is no doubt that the failure of the UN allowed the Cold War to divide Korea, since 1953 it has been the decisions of the divided states to remain divided and hostile. Of course this is more the case in present day in North Korea than the South as, under Communism and left to its own devices, it has fostered a more extreme dictatorship. Yet as Cha echoes, we must understand that the two Koreas were driven so far apart by the civil war that they can never be united again within the foreseeable future as long as the existing regimes continue to hold power, for the North, especially, sees its own people as true ethnic Koreans, not the South.
In light of the arguments expressed, it should be clear that there is no single explanation for the current situation in Korea. The United Nations most definitely played a vital role, for if they had been able to resist US pressure then war might have been avoided. Furthermore, their most critical error was siding with South Korean and US forces during the war because, as the global body of peace and prosperity, it reflects very poorly on a nation to be engaged in a war against the UN. Therefore, although Soviet influence and Communist ideals of course influenced the North Koreans greatly, a large degree of their isolationism and obsession with military might most likely derives from having had most of the world condemning them in the 1950s. North Korea, as a ‘political nation’, was portrayed to the world therefore as evil and corrupt from its birth, so perhaps that offers some explanation for its current state. Therefore the United Nations most certainly contributed greatly to the current divide in Korea, but let us not underestimate the influence of the rival superpowers, with particular reference to such bloodthirsty egoistic commanders as General Douglas MacArthur and CCP chairman Mao Zedong. On a final note, let us always remember that, though the UN and superpowers may have been responsible for dividing Korea in 1945, it is continuing internal tensions that prevent a unified Korea today.
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